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1. Introduction 
 
The motivation of this paper is a compelling paradox in the banking sector in the 
European Union (EU). Over the last decades the EU pursued the creation of a single 
banking market as a cornerstone for a single market for services. Starting with the First 
Banking Directive1 in 1977, the banking regulations have been harmonized to a high 
degree within the European Union. In 1985 the White Paper on “Completing the Internal 
Market” by the European Commission, establishing free circulation of goods, people, and 
capital, created the pathway for a single banking market. The paradox is that despite all 
these changes most of the banks are still very domestically orientated. For example, a 
recent article in the Financial Times says the following as a reaction to the bid by Spain’s 
Santander Central Hispano for Britain’s Abbey National: 
 
“The main reaction, however, has been to see the bid … as an exception 
that proves the rule that European retail banking is still overwhelmingly 
conducted along national lines”.2 
 
There is a vast literature on banking and banking regulations. For example, Dermine 
(2003) presents an overview of European banking, covering both the past and the future 
developments of this industry. He covers in detail the harmonization process, the 
consequences of the integration process in the EU and the introduction of the common 
currency for the banking industry in Europe. The present EU banking sector forms a 
single banking market, with home country control and mutual recognition. By law, any 
provider of banking services can establish itself across the Union and is entitled to the 
same rights as all existing banks in that country. From 1990-2000 the number of mergers 
and acquisitions has increased in the EU (Slager, 2004), which might be partly 
contributed to the changes in the regulatory system. However, the banking industry in the 
EU remains fragmented in practice, since most acquisitions are domestic. The banks that 
                                                 
1 Directive 77/780/EEC on The Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating 
to the Taking Up and Pursuit of Credit Institutions. 
2 The Financial Times Limited, 2004, “Borderless Banking: Why are pan-European Financial Mergers so 
hard?”, Financial Times (London, England), 9 September 2004. 
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venture a foreign investment through branches, joint ventures or acquisitions, do not 
attain high market shares in other European countries. Possible reasons for this fact are 
issues of trust, asymmetric information and transaction costs. A closely related study by 
Gual (2004) provides similar conclusions. Although the harmonization process has 
progressed substantially, there are a couple of reasons why the integration process is not 
complete. The main reasons are natural or strategic barriers (like distance and language) 
and other important differences (company law, contract law and fiscal matters).3 
 
In this paper we want to take a different point of view and evaluate integration of banks’ 
stock returns across the European Union. We extend the methodology of De Nicoló and 
Kwast (2002), who examine the relation of systemic risk with financial consolidation by 
measuring an increase in bivariate correlations, by not only estimating the level of bank 
equity integration but also simultaneously find an estimate for a separate proxy of the 
systemic risk potential, which is purely based on risky periods. As a result, we argue that 
our estimate for the systemic risk potential is more accurate than using the stock price 
correlations directly as De Nicoló and Kwast (2002)4. Our argument is supported by other 
papers5 showing that correlations during more volatile (bear) markets are higher than 
usual.6 Given these considerations, we estimated a regime-switching model to 
differentiate between the states that bank returns can be in. Such a model is capable to 
incorporate the behavior of banks’ asset return in different states of the world. 
                                                 
3 To a certain extent, the situation in the European Union is comparable to the US banking industry. Until 
the end of the 1970s the US had a very segmented banking sector, since the states limited geographical 
expansion by blocking the entry of banks from other states. After that period states slowly started relaxing 
these laws, paving the way for a more national banking system. By now, the US banking sector has become 
highly integrated and the percentage of US banks’ assets held by out-of-state bank holding companies is 
high (in only a few states this percentage is lower than 40%, see Morgan, Rime and Strahan 2003). Here 
lies the most important difference between the US and European banking sector. Although banking 
regulations have been harmonized over the last decades, the actual integration of the banking sector is far 
less developed in Europe than in the US. This can, e.g., be seen from the low market share of foreign banks 
in the EU (in 1999, this percentage is in most EU-countries lower than 10%). According to Slager (2004), 
who studies internationalization of major global banks from 1980-2000, argues that European integration 
cannot be compared to the U.S. banking deregulation. This is due to the fact that it is hard to exploit 
potential efficiency gains and that fiscal policies on savings and pensions are not harmonized. 
4 See De Bandt and Hartmann (2001) for a detailed overview of research on systemic risk. 
5 See e.g. Campbell, Koedijk and Kofman (2001), Longin and Solnik (2001) and Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002) 
6 A related area of research centers on the high volatility periods specifically and studies the possibility of 
contagion. See e.g., Gropp and Moerman (2004) who study contagion for the European banking sector 
using a non-parametric approach. 
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Furthermore, Ang and Bekaert (2002) show that a regime-switching specification can 
deal with changing correlations during volatile (bear) markets. 
 
Our main finding is that, contrary to the lack of real integration, we do find an increase in 
the level of equity market integration for big European banks, while the stock returns of 
smaller banks show a more diverging behavior. Simultaneously, we find that the 
(systemic) risk, as measured by the correlation in the high volatility regime, has not 
increased for most bank pairs in our sample. We argue that a likely explanation for this 
result is caused by the changes in the demand for European stocks. Institutional investors 
have increased their holdings in European stocks as a result of both the common currency 
and the relaxation of restrictive rules on their foreign equity position. As a result of both 
these issues institutional investors have changed their investment styles in European 
stocks towards a more sector-oriented approach. Consequently, the banks with the higher 
market capitalizations will likely be included in the benchmark portfolios of these 
investors. As a result the stock prices of the larger banks will become more correlated. A 
possible implication of our finding is that banks may follow different strategies. One 
strategy is to remain small and target the activities to specific segments (specialization). 
Another strategy is to become a larger bank that offers a wide range of services. As a 
result the latter bank will likely be part of the benchmark index for the European banking 
sector. The advantages for these banks are obvious: better access to capital providers, 
lower costs of capital and higher credit ratings. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will discuss the 
methodology in more detail. In Section 3 a description of the data that we use in this 
paper is given. The results will be discussed in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Methodology 
 
This section describes the models that we apply in this paper. As discussed in the 
introduction we are interested in the level of the interdependencies between stock prices 
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of European banks and especially the change in its level. We model these 
interdependencies with a conditional correlation structure. A regime-switch model 
governs the dynamics in the correlation structure. In this paper we will concentrate on a 
regime-switch model with time varying correlations, which is an extension to the model 
proposed by Ang and Bekaert (2002).7 
 
A well-known characteristic of stock returns is that they do not follow a normal 
distribution. In particular, when considering the joint behavior of stock returns, there is 
evidence that the behavior of the returns in the tails is different from the non-tail returns. 
Historical returns show that large negative shocks tend to spill over to other markets 
easier than regular shocks.8 The correlation or interdependence between stock markets 
seems to be higher in the (negative) tail of this distribution than the correlation of the 
whole distribution. This phenomenon has led to a stream of literature, which tries to 
estimate the changes in the correlations after a large shock. See, for example, Boyer et al. 
(1999), Longin and Solnik (2001), Forbes and Rigobon (2002), and Corsetti et al., (2002). 
One of the conclusions is that the estimated conditional correlation is biased upwards as 
soon as the volatility increases. Several adjustments have been proposed, but there is still 
no consensus or method to estimate the coefficients in an unbiased manner. However, it 
is clear that we need to correct for this bias, because Longin and Solnik (2001) show 
using exceedence correlations that the normal distribution (with or without GARCH-
adjustments) is not capable at all to reconstruct the same exceedence correlations from 
the data. Ang and Bekaert (2002) show that a multiple regime-switch model is capable in 
explaining the exceedence correlations much better than earlier proposed models by, for 
example, Longin and Solnik (2001). The performance improvement can be explained by 
the fact that a regime-switch model is much more flexible in terms of modeling the 
persistence in both the conditional means and variances, compared to the single-regime 
bivariate approach in Longin and Solnik (2001).  
                                                 
7 Baele, Vander Vennet and Van Landschoot (2004) also use a regime-switch model in order to investigate 
whether stock returns of banks with different risk profiles exhibit different risk sensitivities over the 
business cycle. They find that better capitalized and functionally diversified banks are better protected 
against business cycle troughs.  
8 This idea was also pursued in the articles by Longin and Solnik (2001) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002), 
although they used a different modeling approach. 
 6
 
Our model is based upon bivariate comparisons between bank equity returns. Let itR  and 
jtR be the local returns on bank i and j, respectively. Let MtR  be the return on a broad 
European stock index, like the STOXX index.9 Let 1, +tije  be the exchange rate return 
between the currencies in which bank i and j returns are denominated. If these currencies 
are the same, the exchange return is equal to zero. In the case of two banks from the euro 
area, the exchange rate factor is equal to zero as of 1 January 1999. We assume that the 
individual returns have one common factor: the market return. The bivariate model is 
based upon the following equation: 
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We assume that the 1, +tiε  ( 1, +tjε ) are identically and independently normally distributed. 
with variances equal to 1. Note that we do not allow the 2x1 coefficient vector of means 
( )', ji αα and to vary between regimes.10 This is motivated by the results in Ang and 
Bekaert (2002) who show that the hypothesis of equal estimates of the conditional means 
( )', ji αα  in different regimes cannot be rejected. By not making these coefficients state-
dependent, the parameter estimate is much more robust. Estimation of the more general 
regime-switch model does not change our general findings.11 Note that we explicitly do 
not take into account other factors in our model (1), such as the well-known Fama-French 
factors. The reason for this is that we want our estimation results to include the possible 
effects of these variables. Given the estimation results we want to investigate whether 
variables like size have a discriminating effect. 
 
                                                 
9 See Section 3 for a description of the data. 
10 Likewise, we do not allow for regime-dependent vectors ( )', ji ββ  and ( )', ji γγ . 
11 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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The regimes 1+ts  follow a Markov chain with constant transition probabilities. We 
assume that the individual variances of the two stock returns can be in either a high or a 
low regime. This implies that we have 4 (2 x 2) regimes, which can be written as: 
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In words, we allow for a covariance structure of the two stock returns that can vary 
between either low or high states. In order to restrict the number of parameters we 
structure the transition matrix in the following way: 
 
 QP ⊗=Π , 
 
with P and Q transition matrices. 
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where [ ]lowslowsp ititi === + |Pr 11 , is the probability that stock i’s volatility remains in 
the low volatility state. Consequently, [ ]lowshighsp ititi ===− + |Pr1 11 . Likewise, 
[ ]highshighsp ititi === + |Pr 12 , and [ ]highslowsp ititi ===− + |Pr1 12 . This 
parameterization creates two times two independent regimes, in other words, each asset 
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can be in the low volatility or high volatility regime independent of the state the other 
asset is in. As a result we have 4 probability parameters governing the transition between 
regimes. 
 
To complement our model we allow for conditional heteroskedasticity in the returns by 
imposing an ARCH(1) process on the errors in both the high and low states:12 
 
 ( ))(,0~)(| 1,1,1, lowhNlowh tititi +++ε , with 2 1,,,1, )( ++ += tilowilowiti lowh εδω ,  (3a) 
 
and 
 
 ( ))(,0~)(| 1,1,1, highhNhighh tititi +++ε , with 2 1,,,1, )( ++ += tihighihighiti highh εδω . (3b) 
 
Note that this model nests the constant volatility model. When the coefficients lowi ,δ  and 
highi ,δ  (i, j=1,2) are zero, we have a constant volatility model again.  
 
We are mainly interested in the interdependence structure of European banks over time. 
With the regime-switch specification we can distinguish between a higher rate of 
integration and a 'higher risk of contagion'. In this paper integration and contagion are 
defined from a pure statistical point of view by focusing on the correlation coefficient. 
More specifically, regime 1 measures the interdependence between the banks in “normal” 
(low volatility) markets. We expect that the correlation between the European banks’ 
stock returns has risen over the last decade facilitated by the liberalization of European 
capital markets, the harmonization of monetary and policy rules and the Basel committee 
requirements, which require banks to have a sound capital structure. We measure this 
                                                 
12 One could also apply the more familiar GARCH model for describing the conditional heteroskedasticity 
in each regime (see Gray, 1996), however, the regime switch specification already subsumes a lot of the 
heteroskedasticity of the asset returns. Furthermore, Kim and Nelson (1999) argue that modeling GARCH 
in the regime switch specification would destroy the Markov properties of the process through the lagged 
conditional variance measure. 
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hypothesized increase in the correlation coefficient by allowing for a linear time trend in 
the correlation. That is, we replace the coefficients iρ  (i=1,…,4) in (2) with 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )11111 +×+= +++ tss ttt λρρ , 1+ts =1,…,4,    (4) 
 
with 1λ  a parameter that applies to all regimes and the ( )1+tsρ  regime-dependent constant 
parameters. Formulating the time-behavior of the correlations in this way, we are able to 
test for a higher rate of integration between banks by investigating the significance of 1λ . 
The functional specification of the correlation coefficient forces it to lie between –1 and 
1.13 
 
Furthermore, we want to investigate the level of interdependence during times of 
financial distress and especially whether this changes over time. Motivated by Longin 
and Solnik (2001) we enrich the correlation dynamics in the high volatility regime 
( 1+ts =4) by adding another time trend: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )144 211 +×++=+ tt λλρρ .      (5) 
 
This specification allows us to test whether in a joint high-volatility regime the 
correlation trend differs from those in other regimes. In other words, this formulation 
allows us to test whether the risks during volatile (bear) markets has increased more than 
proportionally. A positive value for λ2 would signify an increased risk during volatile 
markets, while a negative value indicates that asset returns are more spread during 
periods of high volatility. The outcome can be an important input in the discussion about 
the efficiency of the Basel agreements. 
 
 
                                                 
13 In order to force the correlation coefficients to the interval [-1,1] we use a logistic function in our 
likelihood evaluations: ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) 11exp1
1exp2
11
11
11 −+++
++=
+
+
++ ts
tss
t
t
tt λρ
λρρ .  
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3. Data 
 
We will use stock data from the largest banks in Europe from the DataStream database. 
Our data period covers the period from 1 January 1990 to 3 March 2003. The data is 
sampled at a weekly frequency, which results in 687 weekly observations. Ideally we 
would like to use stock data from the largest European commercial banks. Unfortunately, 
not for all these banks data is available for the complete data period. An important reason 
for this is that many banks have merged or have been acquired by other banks as a result 
of the consolidation process in the European banking sector (see Slager, 2004). We opted 
for a balanced sample, thereby deleting banks that do not have stock price data available 
for the whole sample. The number of remaining banks is equal to 41. We recognize that 
this procedure could cause our results to suffer from selection bias. Caution should be 
kept when interpreting the results in the sense that our results apply to the chosen banks 
only. In Table 1 we list the banks in our sample together with some descriptive statistics. 
We leave the problem of including banks with shorter sample periods in our analysis for 
further research.  
 
Since we have banks’ stock returns from countries with different currencies we need to 
consider the impact of the relevant exchange rates. As our methodology focuses on the 
joint dynamics of bank shares we chose to use returns denoted in local currencies. In 
order to allow for a possible impact of exchange rates we have included an exchange rate 
factor in Eq. (1) for bank pairs shares denoted in different currencies. The weekly 
exchange rates are taken from DataStream. 
 
The market return that we use is the Dow Jones Euro STOXX 600 index, which is a 
broad index on European stocks denoted in euros.14 In Table 1 we have included the 
summary statistics for this series as well. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 STOXX, STOXX Limited, http://www.stoxx.com (accessed June 03, 2003). 
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4. Results 
 
Using the returns on bank shares we apply the model suggested in Section 2 on each 
combination of banks. In order to get an impression of the estimation results for one 
particular combination of banks we present the estimation results of the regime switch 
model for Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank (BHVB) from Germany and Abbey 
National from the U.K. The range of products that these banks offer are relatively similar 
(mortgages). The local currency denominated stock returns for both banks are plotted in 
Figure 1. In Table 2 we have listed the estimation results from the regime switch model. 
All parameters in the mean equation (1) are significant. The variance parameters iσ  
(i=1,…,4) show that the regimes are in line with the model set-up. Based on a likelihood 
ratio selection criterion we add conditional variance terms - through an ARCH model, see 
Equations (3a) and (3b) - to the model in regimes 1 and 2.15 The constant terms in the 
correlation specifications (Equation (4)), and the special case for the high volatility 
regime (Equation 5), show that the constant correlation coefficients iρ (i=1,…,4) between 
returns is negative except for regime 2. More interestingly, we see that λ1 is negative, 
albeit not significantly, implying that there is a tendency for the correlation coefficient 
between these two banks to decline over time. The high volatility regime correlation 
correction parameter 2λ  is positive (again not significantly so), suggesting that the 
returns between these banks are increasingly higher correlated in that regime.  
 
In order to get an idea about the impact of the parameter values in each of the regimes we 
need to get an idea what regime is the most likely at every moment in the sample period 
for the bivariate return process. This can be achieved by calculating the smoothed regime 
probabilities that we present in Figure 2.16 In the first half of the sample regime 1 is the 
most dominant one. Later, starting around 1997, regimes 3 and 4 are the most dominant 
ones. Regime 2 (high volatility for Abbey National and a low volatility for BHVB) does 
not occur frequently. Together with the previous observation this implies that the 
                                                 
15 Estimation results from this procedure can be obtained from the authors. 
16 For background information on calculating smoothed probabilities from a switching regime model see, 
for example, Kim and Nelson (1999). 
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volatility of BHVB in general is higher than the volatility of Abbey National. The fact 
that regime 1 cannot be found in the latter part of the sample suggests that the volatility of 
both return series has increased. As regimes 3 and 4 seem to be the most influential in 
this period it can be said that the correlation coefficients exhibit some interesting 
behavior. When both volatilities are high (regime 4) the correlation seems to increase as 
21 λλ +  is larger than zero, while the correlation in regime 3 decreases over time (since λ1 
is negative). This can be best seen from Figure 3, where the weighted average of the 
correlation coefficient is depicted.17  
 
In this paper we are interested in the behavior of the correlation dynamics in the banking 
sector as a whole. Table 3 presents the summary statistics on all the bank pairs that we 
have investigated18. On average the results seem to be in line with the example of BHVB 
and Abbey National. However, we find that both the 1λ  and 2λ  parameters are (on 
average) positive, which suggests that the correlation between bank stock returns 
increases over time, irrespective of the regime. On average the correlation increases faster 
over time in regime 4. Figure 4 plots the 1λ  and 2λ  parameters for all 764 bank pairs. As 
can be seen from the table already, the dispersion in 2λ  is much higher than in 1λ . Also, 
the figure suggests that there is a (weak) negative relationship between these two 
parameters, which would point to an offsetting effect of the two parameters in regime 4, 
as is the case in our example of BHVB and Abbey National. Note that in general the 
regimes are identified consistently with the parameter definitions and interpretations from 
Section 2. 
 
Based on the set of bivariate estimation results we conduct some analyses on the 
parameters of interest 1λ  and 2λ  by conditioning on a number of indicators: variance, 
unconditional correlations, euro membership, and bank sizes. In Table 4 we split our 
                                                 
17 Note however that the correlation dynamics are not significant in this example and are mainly used to get 
an impression of the estimation results. 
18 De Nicoló and Kwast (2002) used the same methodology. They examined the time-varying correlations 
in a less flexible framework for bivariate US bank returns.  
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sample based on the unconditional variances of the assets under consideration19. The 
upper part of the table concentrates on those bank pairs, where the volatilities of the low 
states were below (above) the median of σi,low simultaneously. Let’s discuss the first row 
in more detail. It turns out that 188 bank pairs can be identified where σ1,low and σ2,low are 
lower than the median of σi,low. In 92 of these cases λ1 is positive, of which 7 are 
significantly positive. Consequently, in 18 (=25-7) cases λ1 is significantly negative. In 
other words, banks that have a relatively low volatility show a decrease in their 
correlation. On the other hand, banks that have a relatively high volatility (row 2) seem to 
get more correlated over time (29 out of 188 cases show a significantly positive estimate 
for λ1). We also examine the estimates of λ2, but these don’t show any striking results. 
The lower part of Table 4 summarizes the results in case all four unconditional volatilities 
are lower or higher than the median for these values. The results confirm the conclusions 
found in the upper part of the table.  
 
We perform a similar analysis on a division of the results based on the level of the 
correlation coefficient of regime 1, where both assets are in the low volatility regime, and 
regime 4, where both assets are in the high volatility regime. The results in Table 5 show 
that the level of the correlation has an impact on the sign and the importance of the time 
trends in the correlation. These results are not very surprising. Due to the introduction of 
a time trend for the correlation coefficient, the estimate of the base correlation might 
differ from the actual average correlation (leverage). The results suggest that the level of 
the correlation in regime 1 has an impact on the overall time trend (λ1), while the 
correlation in regime 4 has a bigger impact on the significance of λ2. For the observations 
where the estimate of the correlation of regime 1 (4) is lower than the median, more than 
                                                 
19 The unconditional variances for each regime can easily be found from the regression results. In case the 
ARCH components are not significant, the variances of the assets are simply equal to ω2i, state. When an 
ARCH component is included in the model , the unconditional variance can be calculated using: 
2
,
,2
, 1 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−= lowi
statei
statei δ
ωσ  
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82.5% (84.3%) of the observations has a positive value for λ1 (λ2) and 98.4% (100%) of 
the significant estimates are positive. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of conditioning on the fact whether the banks are located in 
countries, which do or do not use the euro as their main currency. The results indicate 
that the location does not really matter for the sign of the parameters 1λ  and 2λ . Again 
we see that the number of significant correlation parameters is not high (around 10%). 
We do see, however, that for combinations of banks for which only one bank has a euro 
home currency, the significant values for 1λ  are predominantly positive. 
 
In Table 7 we split our sample in terms of bank size. Based on market capitalizations 
(measured in 2000, downloaded from the BankScope database) we divide our sample in 
banks that have market capitalizations that are either higher or lower than the median 
capitalization (73,859 million euros). The former banks are denoted ‘big’, the rest is 
called ‘small’. The table shows that estimating the model for two big banks the 1λ  
parameter is positive in 142 of the 180 cases (78.9%). Moreover, if the parameter is 
significant, it is positive in 92.5% of the cases. Interestingly, 1λ  is positive in only 75 of 
the 191 cases when we estimate the model for two small banks, which implies that in 116 
cases 1λ  is negative (60.7%). The significant values for 1λ  in this case are predominantly 
negative (22 out of 27 cases). The results suggest that big European banks are getting 
more integrated over time, whereas smaller banks show opposite behavior. This result 
can not be attributed to econometrical issues (like conditioning on the base level of the 
correlation coefficient, see Table 5). A reason for this result could be that investors 
perceive that the activities of bigger banks get more correlated. An alternative 
explanation can be found in papers by Rouwenhorst (1999), Cavaglia, Brightman, Aked 
(2002), and Moerman (2004). They argue that (institutional) investors in European capital 
markets (should) shift from a country-based towards a sector-based approach. As a 
consequence, investors are tracking industry indices, thereby focusing more on bigger 
banks than on smaller banks. 
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The lower half of Table 7 reports estimates on the 2λ  parameter. This parameter gives an 
indication on the level of systemic risk between two bank stocks, since it is measured 
during highly volatility periods only. In other words, a significantly positive estimate 
would mean that a portfolio containing these two assets becomes riskier. We find that 
these risks do not increase over our sample period. For the different groups the number of 
positive estimates ranges from 52% to 60% and the number of significant estimates is 
relatively low (less than 10%). 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Although the European banking sector has been deregulated over the last few decades 
individual banks remain highly focused on their home markets. In this paper we have 
analyzed whether this apparent lack of physical or real integration also holds for the stock 
price behavior of European banks as well. More specifically, we have analyzed whether 
the stock price dynamics of individual banks become more correlated. 
 
Based on a sample of stock prices of 41 European banks over the period January 1990 – 
March 2003 we estimate the correlation dynamics between all 820 bank pairs. The 
sample that we used consisted of European banks that have a continuous listing over the 
period 1990-2003. We realize that this procedure excludes some interesting banks, which 
as a result of a merger or take-over do not have a continuous listing over our sample 
period. We leave it to further research to deal with this issue. 
 
Our modeling approach is motivated by the bivariate regime switch model of Ang and 
Bekaert (2002), who show that a regime-switch specification is very well capable to deal 
with different correlations over business cycle periods. Based on the combination of 
high/low volatility states for each pair of banks, we have 4 regimes. In each of these 
regimes we allow for specific correlation dynamics in the sense that they can change 
according a linear time trend. The regime identifying both banks being in a high volatility 
state is designed as to pick up increased correlations in times of financial distress by 
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adding an additional time trend. This correlation specification is motivated by Longin and 
Solnik (2001). We find that in general the correlations between banks decline, but in 
times of high volatility the correlation increases.  
 
In our analysis we have conditioned on a number of variables: variance, unconditional 
correlations, euro membership, and bank size. Since the regimes are identified on the 
basis of the bivariate covariance matrix, we find anticipated results when we condition on 
the variance and the correlation. For example, it appears that if the volatility of a bank is 
relatively low, the correlation with other banks decreases. We also report that there are no 
significant differences between banks that originate from the euro area and banks from 
Denmark, Sweden or the U.K.  
 
A more interesting result is that size offers some explanation for the correlation dynamics 
between bank stocks in our sample. The results show that bigger banks, measured by 
their market capitalizations, have a tendency to become more integrated over time. 
Smaller banks seem to show more divergence, as shown by decreasing correlation 
coefficients over time. Simultaneously we find that the risk, as measured by the 
correlation in periods of financial distress, has not increased significantly for both bigger 
and smaller banks. An explanation for this result could be that the bigger banks, which 
are more diversified in their activities, are perceived to be more integrated by investors. 
Another explanation is that the bigger (institutional) investors are turning their equity 
portfolio strategies for the European area from a country-based style towards a sector-
based style. This requires these investors to track industry indices instead of country 
indices. For the banking sector this would imply that these investors will focus more on 
the larger banks than on the smaller banks in the European area, thereby inducing a 
tendency for correlations to increase. An implication of this phenomenon could be that 
the European banks will be forced to follow either of two strategies. The first one is to 
remain a small and specialized bank, with activities in a regional setting. The other 
strategy is to integrate and become a larger player in Europe. The advantages of the latter 
strategy are that banks can get easier access to capital market, leading to lower funding 
 17
risk, lower costs of capital, and higher credit ratings. As a result capital market forces will 
help in breaking the integration paradox of European banking. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
This table summarizes the statistics of the weekly returns of the 41 European banks in our sample. The 
lowest row of the table also contains the statistics of the Dow Jones Euro STOXX 600 index that we used 
to proxy the European market. Sample period: January 1, 1990 – March 3, 2003. The first column of the 
table presents the market capitalization of the bank (measured in 2000, Bankscope). 
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1 Fortis 332,092 0.166 4.18 -21.19 16.62 -0.311 5.61 
2 KBC Bank 176,909 0.205 3.78 -15.25 21.74 0.374 6.48 
3 Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank 694,300 0.015 4.89 -19.95 21.67 -0.093 5.86 
4 Commerzbank 454,500 -0.029 4.55 -17.70 29.33 0.198 7.70 
5 Deutsche bank 927,900 0.076 4.17 -16.54 22.70 0.038 5.30 
6 IKB Deutsche Industriebank 32,359 0.039 2.49 -9.06 11.45 0.155 5.29 
7 Danske Bank 182,520 0.220 3.49 -12.18 15.69 0.341 4.61 
8 Jyske Bank 17,044 0.191 3.22 -21.09 25.81 0.750 13.75 
9 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 292,557 0.276 4.77 -19.64 27.96 0.378 7.41 
10 Banco Espanol de Credito 44,381 0.017 5.72 -61.95 65.65 0.694 49.49 
11 Banco Popular Espanol 31,288 0.325 3.77 -16.38 14.33 0.138 4.36 
12 Banco Santander Central Hispano 347,288 0.249 4.85 -24.34 22.60 -0.141 5.93 
13 Natexis Banques Populaires 113,131 0.069 4.15 -16.81 18.35 0.269 5.10 
14 Societe Generale 455,881 0.266 5.16 -22.08 26.85 0.274 5.50 
15 Alpha Bank 30,183 0.476 5.99 -21.59 29.28 0.701 6.15 
16 Commercial Bank of Greece 16,164 0.528 7.54 -34.06 57.66 1.247 10.86 
17 EFG Eurobank Ergasias 16,833 0.482 7.92 -29.25 46.90 1.850 12.18 
18 Allied Irish Banks 77,932 0.284 4.12 -15.45 16.58 -0.063 4.69 
19 Anglo Irish Bankcorp 11,047 0.383 4.39 -13.25 17.50 0.354 4.28 
20 Bank of Ireland 73,859 0.372 4.07 -17.06 13.23 -0.007 3.93 
21 Banca Agricola Mantovana 10,190 0.140 2.98 -14.43 21.36 0.756 11.60 
22 Banca Intesa 331,364 0.267 5.69 -22.05 38.55 0.930 8.99 
23 Banca di Roma 132,729 -0.017 6.09 -22.82 35.89 0.739 7.89 
24 Banca Populare Bergamo 37,670 0.141 3.38 -12.20 16.84 0.475 5.73 
25 Banca Populare Commercial e Industria 20,911 0.066 3.95 -16.83 31.39 1.031 12.63 
26 Banca Populare di Intra 3,929 0.195 3.39 -13.15 15.82 0.595 6.22 
27 Banca Populare di Lodi 34,223 0.083 3.90 -15.31 24.22 0.583 7.55 
28 Banca Populare di Milano 28,282 0.094 4.70 -29.58 24.62 0.302 7.17 
29 Credito Emiliano 15,148 0.135 5.89 -18.83 27.60 0.751 5.48 
30 Credito Valtellinese 7,416 0.074 2.93 -17.39 13.94 0.651 9.04 
31 Unicredito Italiano 202,649 0.294 5.65 -26.49 53.70 1.619 16.54 
32 Banco Comercial Portugues 61,850 0.043 3.72 -14.36 25.00 0.980 10.21 
33 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB) 118,261 0.363 8.23 -47.54 120.90 5.101 75.33 
34 Svenska Handelsbanken (SHB) 114,194 0.378 5.79 -22.54 69.30 3.239 39.25 
35 Abbey National 293,395 0.212 4.41 -15.54 21.30 0.199 4.96 
36 Barclays 486,936 0.294 4.69 -17.77 22.49 0.162 5.07 
37 Close Brothers 3,241 0.301 4.54 -17.74 30.92 0.482 8.38 
38 Schroders 4,180 0.278 4.73 -24.56 24.58 -0.163 7.31 
39 Singer & Friendlander Group 2,792 0.180 4.32 -14.16 25.10 0.839 6.25 
40 Standard Chartered 161,964 0.392 5.58 -22.43 42.31 0.728 8.69 
41 Royal Bank of Scotland 206,176 0.413 4.91 -21.10 21.70 0.185 5.62 
        
 Dow Jones Euro STOXX 600 index 0.157 2.44 -12.49 7.30 -0.597 5.49 
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Table 2: Estimation results of the regime switch model: 
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank and Abbey National 
This table presents the parameter estimates and standard errors of the complete regime switching model for 
one specific bank pair: Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank (denoted by bank1) and Abbey National 
(denoted by bank2). The four states in the variance equation are based on the two possible states that each 
banks asset can be in. State 1(4) represents the state where both assets’ volatilities are low(high), while 
state 2 is the state where the volatility of bank 1 is low, while the volatility of bank 2 is high, for state 3 the 
other way around. 
 
 
 
  Parameter estimates Standard error 
Mean equation  
 α1  Constant, bank1 -0.081 *** 0.013 
 α2  Constant, bank2 0.146 *** 0.016 
 β1  Market, bank1 1.079 *** 0.004 
 β2  Market, bank2 0.944 *** 0.004 
 γ1  Exch.rate, bank1 0.310 *** 0.010 
 γ2  Exch rate, bank2 0.504 *** 0.012 
     
Variance equation  
 ω1, low 5.63 *** 0.298 
 ω1,high 22.28 *** 8.540 
 ω2,low 8.48 *** 0.530 
 ω2,high 35.70  29.56 
 δ1,low 0.034 *** 0.004 
 δ1,high 0.307 *** 0.010 
 δ2,low 0  -- 
 δ2,high 0  -- 
     
 1ρ  -0.060  0.031 
 2ρ  0.452  0.471 
 3ρ  -0.017  0.144 
 4ρ  -0.518  1.661 
     
Transition parameters  
 P11 0.992 *** 0.000 
 P22 0.991 *** 0.000 
 Q11 0.986 *** 0.000 
 Q22 0.953 *** 0.000 
     
Lambda parameters    
 λ1 -0.226  0.192 
 λ2 1.165  2.847 
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Table 3. Statistics of the model coefficients 
We have 41 banks in our sample, which would result in 820 bank pairs. For sake of robustness, we 
excluded some of the models in the following way. 56 of these bank pair models were excluded based on 
the restriction that all probabilities should be higher than 0.5 and that all correlation coefficients should be 
smaller than 0.9975 in absolute value. In the deleted pairs the regimes might be too heavily influenced by 
outliers, which would result in misinterpretations of the regimes. The table below gives the statistics of the 
model coefficients on the remaining 764 bank pair models. In 434 models a conditional heteroskedasticity 
correction (ARCH) has been performed. 
 
Parameter Average Median St.dev Min Max Observations 
α1 -0.038 -0.037 0.166 -0.580 0.361 764 
α2 -0.017 -0.028 0.185 -0.538 0.374 764 
β1 0.726 0.733 0.356 0.130 1.404 764 
β2 0.693 0.731 0.356 0.117 1.339 764 
γ1 -0.054 -0.037 0.226 -0.941 0.600 764 
γ2 -0.013 0.000 0.358 -1.071 1.192 764 
P11  0.946   0.964  0.052  0.604  0.998  764 
P22  0.888   0.934  0.118  0.504  1.000  764 
Q11  0.936   0.966  0.072  0.644  0.998  764 
Q22  0.878   0.927  0.116  0.502  1.000  764 
1ρ  0.036 0.012 0.189 -0.401 0.832 764 
2ρ  0.027 0.022 0.265 -0.945 0.955 764 
3ρ  0.020 0.008 0.263 -0.968 0.980 764 
4ρ  0.020 0.034 0.465 -0.989 0.997 764 
ω1, low 6.06  5.30 4.14 0.70 18.74 764 
ω1,high 47.67  23.20 71.87 8.55 651.81 764 
ω2,low 7.33 5.94 4.97 0.69 20.36 764 
ω2,high 78.04 30.89 146.20 9.67 1,918.45 764 
δ1,low 0.113 0.096 0.119 0.000 0.595 434 
δ1,high 0.122 0.071 0.134 0.000 0.727 434 
δ2,low 0.096 0.096 0.100 0.000 0.603 434 
δ2,high 0.117 0.048 0.161 0.000 0.973 434 
λ1 0.076 0.079 0.578 -1.930 2.041 764 
λ2 0.304 0.172 2.845 -18.748 18.700 764 
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Table 4. Results after a split based on the variance  
This table presents some statistics for the parameters λ1 (time trend in all correlation coefficients) and λ2 
(extra time trend only for regime 4, i.e. when both assets are in the high volatility regime). The whole set of 
bivariate results is divided into subsets according to a split based on the median of the unconditional 
variance of each parameter. Based on the subsets we can see whether there are differences for certain 
classes of assets. The upper part of the table deals with the case of assets that both banks have a lower or 
higher variance estimate (compared to its median) for the low volatility regime The lower part of the table 
concentrates on the cases where all four volatilities are lower (higher) than the median of these volatilities. 
The median of the volatilities is the median over both assets (over σ1,low and σ2,low for the low volatility, 
σ1,high and σ2,high for the high volatility respectively). See footnote 11 for more information on the 
calculation of the unconditional volatilities. The median unconditional variance of the low and high 
volatility regime is 5.627 and 29.861 respectively  
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Both volatilities in base regime are simultaneously lower or higher than the median 
λ1 (variances low in base regime) 188 92 (48.9%) 25 (13.3%) 7 (28.0%) 
λ1 (variances high in base regime) 188 128 (68.1%) 35 (18.6%) 29 (82.9%) 
        
λ2 (variances low in base regime) 188 100 (53.2%) 19 (10.1%) 9 (47.4%) 
λ2 (variances high in base regime) 188 109 (58.0%) 9 (4.8%) 6 (66.7%) 
     
ALL volatilities are simultaneously lower or higher than the median 
λ1 (all variances lower) 103 47 (45.6%) 16 (15.5%) 5 (31.3%) 
λ1 (all variances higher) 105 69 (65.7%) 17 (16.2%) 13 (76.5%) 
        
λ2 (all variances lower) 103 61 (59.2%) 10 (9.7%) 6 (60.0%) 
λ2 (all variances higher) 105 66 (62.9%) 5 (4.8%) 3 (60.0%) 
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Table 5. Results after a split based on the correlation coefficients  
This table presents some statistics for the parameters λ1 (time trend in all correlation coefficients) and λ2 
(extra time trend only for regime 4, i.e. when both assets are in the high volatility regime). The whole 
subset is divided into subsets based on the estimates of the correlation coefficients. Only the correlations of 
regime 1 and regime 4 are taken into account, since both assets are then in the same regime (low volatility 
vs. high volatility).  
The first part of the table compares the λ-parameters in case the correlation in regime 1 is lower (higher) 
than its median (0.012). The second part presents the same for the correlation in regime 4 (median = 0.034). 
The last part of table takes the intersection of these two restrictions. 
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Subsamples based on the comparison of the correlation of regime 1 with its median
λ1 (corr1 < median(corr1)) 382 315 (82.5%) 61 (16.0%) 60 (98.4%) 
λ1 (corr1 => median(corr1)) 382 128 (33.5%) 44 (11.5%) 7 (15.9%) 
        
λ2 (corr1 < median(corr1)) 382 164 (42.9%) 24 (6.3%) 7 (29.2%) 
λ2 (corr1 => median(corr1)) 382 252 (66.0%) 35 (9.2%) 29 (82.9%) 
     
Subsamples based on the comparison of the correlation of regime 4 with its median 
λ1 (corr4 < median(corr4)) 382 268 (70.2%) 48 (12.6%) 41 (85.4%) 
λ1 (corr4 => median(corr4)) 382 175 (45.8%) 57 (14.9%) 26 (45.6%) 
        
λ2 (corr4 < median(corr4)) 382 322 (84.3%) 34 (8.9%) 34 (100.0%) 
λ2 (corr4 => median(corr4)) 382 94 (24.6%) 25 (6.5%) 2 (8.0%) 
     
Subsamples based on the comparison of the correlation of regime 1 and regime 4 with their medians 
λ1 (corr1 &corr4 < median) 199 184 (92.5%) 37 (18.6%) 37 (100.0%) 
λ1 (corr1 & corr4 => median) 199 44 (22.1%) 33 (16.6%) 3 (9.1%) 
     
λ2 (corr1 & corr4 < median) 199 151 (75.9%) 7 (3.5%) 7 (100.0%) 
λ2 (corr1 & corr4 => median) 199 81 (40.7%) 8 (4.0%) 2 (25.0%) 
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Table 6. Differences between euro area countries and non euro area countries 
This table summarizes the statistics on λ1 and λ2 based on the country where the banks originates. All bank 
pair regression thus fall into three separate categories: 1) both banks originate from a euro area country; 2) 
both banks originate from a country that is not in the European Monetary Union and 3) the two banks come 
from different subsets, i.e. one is from a euro area country, while the other is not. 
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λ1 (euro banks only) 413 222 (53.8%) 54 (13.1%) 26 (48.1%) 
λ1 (non-euro banks only) 49 28 (57.1%) 5 (10.2%) 2 (40.0%) 
λ1 (euro vs. non-euro) 302 193 (63.9%) 46 (15.2%) 39 (84.8%) 
     
λ2 (euro banks only) 413 235 (56.9%) 41 (9.9%) 27 (65.9%) 
λ2 (non-euro banks only) 49 20 (40.8%) 4 (8.2%) 2 (50.0%) 
λ2 (euro vs. non-euro) 302 161 (53.3%) 14 (4.6%) 7 (50.0%) 
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Table 7. Differences between big banks and small banks 
This table summarizes the statistics on λ1 and λ2 based on the size of the banks. All bank pair regressions 
thus fall into three separate categories: 1) both banks are big banks; 2) both banks are small banks and 3) 
one of the banks is considered a big bank, while the other is small.  
The size of the bank is measured on the basis of the total market capitalization in the year 2000 (source: 
BankScope). A bank is considered big when the total market capitalization is higher than the median and 
smaller otherwise. 
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λ1 (big banks only) 180 142 (78.9%) 40 (22.2%) 37 (92.5%) 
λ1 (small banks only) 191 75 (39.3%) 27 (14.1%) 5 (18.5%) 
λ1 (1 big and 1 small) 393 226 (57.5%) 38 (9.7%) 25 (65.8%) 
     
λ2 (big banks only) 180 108 (60.0%) 9 (5.0%) 6 (66.7%) 
λ2 (small banks only) 191 100 (52.4%) 15 (7.9%) 7 (46.7%) 
λ2 (1 big and 1 small) 393 208 (52.9%) 35 (8.9%) 23 (65.7%) 
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Figure 1: Returns on Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank and Abbey National 
We consider one specific bank pair in more detail: Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbanks and Abbey 
National. This figure depicts the weekly return series of both assets, that served as an input to the regime 
switching model. The upper graph is the picture of the returns of the German bank and the lower graph 
depicts the returns of Abbey National. 
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Figure 2. Smoothed probabilities for Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank versus 
Abbey National  
This is an example of the smoothed probabilities of our regime switching model. The pictures below show 
the smoothed probabilities of all four possible states for the complete bank pair model (i.e. including the 
parameters λ`1 and λ2) for the bank pair: Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank and Abbey National. 
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Figure 3: Time varying correlation between BHVB and Abbey National 
This graph depicts the changing correlation coefficient over time between the Bayerische Hypo- und 
Vereinsbank (BHVB) and Abbey National. This coefficient is a weighted average of the four different 
correlations of each regime, with the weights equal to the inferenced probabilities of the regime switching 
model. 
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Figure 4: Correlation time trend coefficients 
This graph depicts the relationship between λ1 and λ2. λ1 is plotted on the horizontal axis and λ2 is on the 
vertical axis. The plot shows the λ’s of all bank pairs, irrespective of the significance of these parameters. 
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